


# Ambassador Jefferson Caffery (1886-1974): Latin American Posts

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Brazil (1937-44)







**F**rom 1936 to 1940, President Roosevelt hosted a series of “inter-American” meetings in Buenos Aires, Argentina, and Havana, Cuba, for United States Ambassadors to gather together and discuss concerns towards the possibility of the Axis powers invading North America (Dur “Highlights” 380). When Caffery was leaving one of these meetings in January of 1937, Assistant Secretary of State Sumner Welles summoned Caffery to Washington where he offered him the position as Ambassador to Brazil (Dur “Highlights” 385-86). When Caffery served as Assistant Secretary of State in 1933, he had spent some time studying the Brazilian economy so he was already somewhat familiar with certain aspects of Brazilian

affairs (The Times-Picayune, Washington Bureau). By the time Caffery entered his post, he had had more than nine years of experience in Latin American ambassadorships and was often referred to as an expert in Latin American affairs as a result; Sumner Welles knew and obviously respected this when he appointed Caffery to Brazil (The Times-Picayune, Washington Bureau; Dur “Highlights” 380). Although Caffery was appointed as ambassador in January of 1937, he did not officially leave his Cuban post until March of 1937, and did not officially enter his post as Ambassador to Brazil until August 17, 1937 (Office of Historian). Caffery had not had vacation time since 1932, so he requested to have March through August off to which the State Department approved (Dur “Ambassador” 20).

While Caffery was still in Washington, Mrs. “Gypsy” Lewis, a long-time friend of his and wife of an Illinois Senator invited Caffery to lunch in order for him to meet her friend Ms. Gertrude McCarthy (Dur “Highlights” 385-86). Some time earlier, Caffery had asked Gypsy to help him find a wife, and he trusted her completely when it came to her matchmaking abilities (Dur “Highlights” 385). The name “Gypsy” was not given to her at birth, but was rather a nickname given to her for her “fortune-telling...hobby” and desire to “help people arrange their lives” (Dur “Highlights” 385). Upon meeting the “extreme modesty and simplicity” that was Ms. McCarthy, as described by a Brazilian reporter, Caffery knew that she was the one for him; Ms. McCarthy felt likewise (Dur “Highlights” 385).

Caffery spent two-and-a-half of his five months off getting to know Ms. McCarthy in her hometown of Chicago meeting her friends and family (Dur “Highlights” 386). Caffery’s marriage to Ms. McCarthy came with a lofty fortune, much more than that of his, and would come in handy during Caffery’s time in Brazil (Dur “Highlights” 387). Ms. McCarthy’s mother’s side of the family owned an extremely successful cigar business and tobacco factory that Ms. McCarthy’s mother inherited when her father died (Dur “Highlights” 386-87). Ms. McCarthy’s father was a distinguished career military officer

and graduate of West Point military academy, who participated in many influential military operations throughout his career (Dur “Highlights” 386). Caffery and Ms. McCarthy quickly married on November 20, 1937 in Rio de Janeiro, which was photographed by *Life* magazine, just three months after Caffery entered his post in Brazil; Caffery was fifty years old at the time of their marriage and Ms. McCarthy forty-two (Dur “Highlights” 385; University of Louisiana at Lafayette). Although the couple married late in life, their marriage lasted almost 40 years until Mrs. Caffery’s death in July 1973, where Jefferson Caffery died just months later (The New York Times). According to Philip Dur, they had a healthy marriage despite the fact that the two “did not have the privacy necessary to develop real intimacy,” but I guess that is a consequence of having career responsibilities that affect the outcomes of the entire world (“Ambassador” 20).





On August 17, 1937, Caffery entered his post as Ambassador to Brazil and served in that capacity for a total of 7 years until 1944; Brazil was Caffery's longest ambassadorship (Office of Historian; Dur "Highlights" 380). Caffery served in Brazil throughout the majority of World War II and was the one ultimately responsible for keeping Brazil from joining the Axis powers.

To give a brief history leading up to World War II, on January 30, 1933, Adolf Hitler was appointed as chancellor of Germany (The National WWII Museum). Three months after Hitler's appointment, The Enabling Act of 1933 passed which gave Hitler complete power over Germany, dissolving the Reichstag, which was Germany's parliament, and giving Hitler complete totalitarian power over Germany (The National WWII Museum). Three years later in 1936, Nazi Germany carried out its first act of war, violating the Treaty of Versailles peace pact made in 1919 that ended World War I, and officially instigating World War II (The National WWII Museum). Three years later on September 1, 1939 Germany invaded Poland causing Great Britain and France to declare war against Germany (The National WWII Museum). A little over a year later on September 27, 1940, the Axis powers officially joined together when Germany, Italy, and Japan signed the Tripartite Pact, which "provides for mutual assistance should any of its

members suffer attack by any nation not already involved in the war” (The National WWII Museum). On June 22, 1941, Germany began their invasion of the Soviet Union influencing the Soviet Union to join the Allied powers, which Great Britain and the United States would also soon join (The National WWII Museum). On December 7, 1941, Japan bombed the infamous Pearl Harbor and the United States officially declared war on Japan (Scholastic). Considering Japan, Italy, and Germany had signed the Tripartite Act the year before, when the United States had declared war on Japan, the United States was also declaring war against Italy and Germany (Scholastic). For the next four years, the main Allied powers of Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States continued to fight against the Axis powers of Germany, Italy, and Japan until the Allied powers’ defeat over the Axis on September 2, 1945 (Scholastic).

Brazil was an important trading partner to the United States with each country benefitting from the other. The United States received more than 50% of Brazilian coffee exports and more than 30% of Brazil’s imports were from the United States (Dur “Highlights” 380-81). In 1937, however, Germany became Brazil’s chief receiver of exports replacing the United States, and leading to questions of whether or not this meant that Brazil was soon going to join Germany in World War II (Dur “Highlights” 381). Speculation increased even more when taken into consideration that, of Brazil’s 45 million inhabitants, 4 million of them were Italian, 1 million were German, and roughly 200,000 of them were Japanese, with most of the Brazilian army generals also being “pro-German” (Dur “Ambassador” 21). Getulio Vargas had been president of Brazil since 1930, solidifying his rule through the force of the Brazilian army (Dur “Ambassador” 21). In January 1938, just five months after Caffery’s arrival, a presidential election was expected to take place where Vargas was going to do everything in his power to remain in power, heavily relying on the Brazilian armed forces to do so (Dur “Ambassador” 21). On November 10, 1937, just two months before the election was supposed to take place, Vargas ordered his troops to surround the palace where Congress was meeting in order to threaten their decision-making towards the upcoming election; Vargas succeeded in



instilling fear upon the members of Congress and was able to solidify his rule yet again (Dur “Ambassador” 21). That same night, Vargas declared a new Brazilian state of “Estado Novo,” which was described as a “corporative state with a fascist constitution which allowed him to rule by decree until forced out of office in 1945,” increasing the public’s fear of Brazil joining Nazi Germany that much more (Dur “Ambassador” 21). According to Soucy, although there are many different forms of fascism, there are commonalities “including extreme militaristic nationalism, contempt for electoral democracy and political and cultural liberalism, a belief in natural social hierarchy and the rule of elites, and the desire to create a Volksgemeinschaft (German: “people’s community”), in which individual interests would be subordinated to the good of the nation.” Despite being told by Brazilian Foreign Minister Oswaldo Aranha that Vargas’ “new constitution would ‘preserve the democratic institutions’ while simply giving ‘additional powers to the president’,” Caffery remained unconvinced (Dur “Highlights” 384). On November 10, 1937, the same day that Vargas announced his “Estado Novo” constitution, Caffery sent a telegram to Sumner Welles stating, “I am a little skeptical about the effective ‘preservation of democratic institutions’ under the new constitution” (Dur “Highlights” 384). Provided these circumstances, Caffery’s hope for Brazilian neutrality in World War II was extremely low, but as we will see, Caffery prevailed just as he always did.

Before the United States could recognize Vargas’ presidency, Sumner Welles instructed Caffery to meet with Vargas on November 13, 1937, to scope out Vargas’ stance on foreign policy and to get a better understanding of how Vargas was planning to rule Brazil this time around (Dur “Ambassador” 22; Dur “Highlights” 384). Despite the speculation that Brazil was going to join the Axis powers, Vargas explicitly told Caffery during this meeting that “my government has absolutely no connection with Rome, Berlin and Tokyo” and there was no reason to worry of such occurring (Dur “Ambassador” 22; Dur “Highlights” 384). Supposedly, Caffery did not debrief the State Department on how he had convinced Vargas to make these comments, but later on in

Caffery's life he admitted that during this meeting he had threatened Vargas and told him that if he "broke the united front of the American republics...American imports of Brazilian coffee might be cut off;" an action that would have severely hurt the Brazilian economy and an extremely smart move by Caffery that obviously worked (Dur "Highlights" 385; Dur "Ambassador" 22). Later on that night, with the persuasion from Caffery, Vargas held a press conference where he reiterated to the people of Brazil and abroad that there was to be no cause for concern regarding Brazilian-German partnership, and even adding that the United States "deserve our special consideration" (Dur "Highlights" 384).

Germany feared Caffery due to his previous success at negotiating partnerships with countries that would normally otherwise avoid relationships with the United States (Dur "Ambassador" 23). Dr. Goebbels' Ministry of Propaganda in Germany even titled Caffery as the "Ambassador of Revolutions" due to his unwavering success, a name that would forever go down in history when describing the Ambassador (Dur "Ambassador" 23). As a result of Caffery's presence in Brazil, Germany sent German Ambassador to Brazil Dr. Karl Ritter to counter whatever Caffery was attempting to accomplish between a Brazilian and United States partnership (Dur "Ambassador" 22). Ritter was also assigned to maintain influence in Brazil's German population by encouraging pro-Nazi ideological beliefs, although Ritter claimed in multiple press conferences that this was not the reason for his presence in Brazil (Dur "Highlights" 382). As a result of Ritter's presence in the region, Vargas began to distrust Ritter's intentions and conflicts arose between the two men (Dur "Ambassador" 22). Brazilian Foreign Minister Oswaldo Aranha also began to have problems with Ritter and his pro-Nazi ideology (Dur "Ambassador" 22). Consequently in September of 1938, while Ritter was in Germany attending an event, Brazilian Foreign Minister Aranha declared Ritter *persona non grata*, preventing him from returning to Brazil and temporarily suspending the diplomatic relations between Germany and Brazil (Dur "Highlights" 382-3).

From October 1938 to April 1939, Caffery took a six-month vacation during which he and his wife were finally able to go on their honeymoon (Dur “Ambassador” 23). Additionally in October of 1938, Caffery took a four-day excursion to the top of Brazil’s second tallest mountain, Mount Itatiaya, with the wife and daughter of the British Ambassador, the two daughters of the Danish minister, and Walter Geyerhahn, who was supposedly the “experienced Alpinist” who guided them all (Dur “Highlights” 390). Caffery loved the outdoors and adventuring through nature, which unfortunately Mrs. Caffery could not relate to, so she often stayed put in the Embassy while Caffery explored with his friends and staff (Dur “Highlights” 390). Upon Caffery’s arrival back to Brazil in August of 1939, Vargas was still trying to “balance off,” as Philip Dur describes, the United States and Germany for control over Brazil (“Ambassador” 23). At this time, the CIA and FBI were nonexistent in the United States, which hindered United States’ intelligence and gave Germany the upper hand (Dur “Ambassador” 23). Germany had more intelligence than the United States and used it to spew espionage and propaganda to which Caffery consistently tried to counter with the information he had (Dur “Ambassador” 23). For the next two years until the Pearl Harbor attack on December 7, 1941, Germany and the United States continued to compete for Brazil (Dur “Ambassador” 23).

Considering Brazil was filled with communities of people from the Axis powers, and Brazil’s close proximity to Africa at Brazil’s northeast corner of “the Bulge,” both Brazilian and American forces feared that this area would be a target for Axis attack (Dur “Ambassador” 23). Brazil agreed to allow the United States army to establish air and navel bases in Brazil but nothing else (Dur “Ambassador” 24). Brazil was determined to use its own armed forces to counter the German ones in order to secure Brazilian autonomy, though, Brazil did ask the United States for financial assistance in order to supply adequate weaponry and artillery (Dur “Ambassador” 24). On April 6, 1941, Brazil and the United States drafted an agreement, which stated, “in case of Axis attack, United States forces would assist Brazil, ‘when expressly requested by the

Brazilian government,' and that the United States would, in any event, provide for the modernization of Brazil's armament" (Dur "Ambassador" 24). The United States War Department really wanted to be the ones to occupy the area of "the Bulge," but, as Caffery knew and informed the War Department of, requesting power over this area would threaten Brazil's autonomy and make enemies out of Vargas and Aranha (Dur "Highlights" 394). As Philip Dur points out, Brazil was not completely on the United States' side at this point, and if Caffery requested this to Vargas it could have easily dissipated United States and Brazilian relations; Brazil could have easily chose German partnership instead (Dur "Ambassador" 23). Despite Caffery telling the War Department this, they sent a letter to Sumner Welles anyway, requesting that he order Caffery to make Vargas agree to the United States' occupation of the vulnerable area of the Bulge (Dur "Ambassador" 25). Welles simply forwarded the War Department's request to Caffery without ordering Caffery to do anything; Caffery chose to do nothing, well aware that if he did bring this up to Vargas, Brazilian and United States partnership would become a thing of the past (Dur "Ambassador" 25).

Two days later, two officials from the War Department decided to go behind Welles' back and send a letter to President Roosevelt requesting that Roosevelt make an executive order and demand that Caffery force Vargas' consent over the United States' occupation of the Bulge (Dur "Ambassador" 25). After conversing with Roosevelt, Welles sent a telegram to Caffery stating, "...the possibility of German aggression is becoming more imminent...the most vulnerable points are Iceland and Natal...The President feels that under the circumstances the approach outlined in my letter should be made" (Dur "Highlights" 394). Caffery knew that he could not bring these requests up to Vargas, so instead he went to Brazilian Foreign Minister Aranha to get his perspective on the matter to which Aranha "threw his hands up in agitation," according to an account provided by a United States General who was in attendance (Dur "Highlights" 394). Therefore, Caffery yet again chose to do nothing because he knew that if the "pro-American" Aranha was in disbelief over the request, he could only

imagine how Vargas would respond (Dur “Ambassador” 23). During the course of Caffery and Aranha’s conversation, Caffery began to wonder if there was something that he could offer to Brazil in hopes that it would later encourage Brazil to agree to the United States occupation of the Bulge (Dur “Highlights” 394). Caffery discussed with Aranha the possibility of Brazil joining forces with the United States in defending some other territory abroad; Aranha was not opposed to this idea and even asked for some additional time to think about it (Dur “Highlights” 394-95). After Caffery and Aranha’s meeting, Caffery sent Welles a telegram on June 27, 1941, referring to Roosevelt’s request,

*“As the Department is aware, President Vargas has been leaning more and more in our direction during the past few months. He is definitely on our side, but certainly the moment has not yet arrived when he could agree to this proposal and get away with it. He would think I should know better than to put it up to him in this way at this juncture.”*

–AMBASSADOR CAFFERY TO SUMNER WELLES (DUR “HIGHLIGHTS” 394)

Caffery had also included in the telegram what he had proposed to Aranha, and when Welles debriefed Roosevelt on Caffery’s telegram, Roosevelt willingly considered the proposal (Dur “Highlights” 395).

Two weeks later on July 10, 1941, President Roosevelt sent a letter to Vargas suggesting that the Brazilian military join the United States forces in occupying the small Dutch colony of Surinam; Vargas accepted (Dur “Ambassador” 25). At this point neither Aranha, Caffery, nor President Roosevelt mentioned anything to Vargas pertaining to

the United States interests in occupying the Bulge, but they all hoped that through Caffery's strategic plan, a foundation of trust would form and solidify between the United States and Brazilian governments (Dur "Ambassador" 25).

Three months later in October of 1941, the War Department had discovered that neither Roosevelt nor Welles had instructed Caffery to demand Vargas' consent, and therefore General Miller decided to take the matter into his own hands; a move he would later regret (Dur "Ambassador" 25; Dur "Highlights" 396). General Miller was head of the United States Military Mission to Brazil and decided that he would go around Welles, Roosevelt, and Caffery, and settle the Bulge negotiations himself (Marshall). General Miller met with the War Minister of Brazil and threatened that if Vargas didn't consent to the American occupation of the Bulge, the United States military would have to retaliate and invade Brazil (Dur "Ambassador" 25). Of course, the Brazilian War Minister told General Miller that if that were to happen, Brazil would be forced to fight back, to which Miller then threatened to have the War Minister removed from office (Dur "Ambassador" 25). General Miller had no authority to be giving these threats, especially considering all of the strategic planning Roosevelt and Caffery were conducting, so when the State Department found out that Miller was going behind everyone's backs, Caffery insisted that General Miller be recalled and so he was declared *persona non grata* in February of 1942 (Dur "Ambassador" 25; Dur "Highlights" 396).

Two months later at the Rio conference in January of 1942, also known as The Third Meeting of Consultation of Latin American Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Vargas officially broke free from the Axis powers (Encyclopedia; Dur "Ambassador" 26). This meant that the United States no longer had to fear Brazil joining the Axis powers and that Brazil was officially on their side; the perfect opportunity to propose to Vargas the War Department's request to occupy the area of the Bulge. If Brazil agreed to allow the United States' occupation, the State Department would agree to provide additional

military equipment to Brazil, that is, if the newly established Munitions Allocation Board approved the transfer (Dur “Highlights” 397).

On February 21, 1942, the Munitions Allocation Board approved sending Brazil twenty light tanks and four anti-aircraft guns that would be taken from the United States military and sent to Brazil (Dur “Ambassador” 26). Welles telegraphed Caffery about the approval and also requested that Caffery ask Vargas for “blanket clearance” “of the Ferrying Command’s flights along the northeast coast of Brazil from French Guiana to Recife,” also known as the “Corridor of Victory” (Dur “Ambassador” 26; Dur “Highlights” 392). The Corridor of Victory was built by Pan American Airlines and was a 100-mile string of air lanes along the Brazilian coast, which eventually became the “air funnel to the battlefields of the world” as Philip Dur calls it (Dur “Highlights” 392, 397). In December of 1941, the Brazilian government gave the United States access to the Corridor of Victory allowing the United States military three flights per week to transfer things such as “fighting personnel, Government officials, diplomatic mail, etc.” through Brazil to Africa, but the flights still had to be approved by the Brazilian government before hand (Dur “Highlights” 397). Welles’ request for “blanket clearance” meant that the United States wanted full access to these corridors without the Brazilian government having to approve every flight beforehand and/or preventing the amount of flights that they were allowed to take per week (Dur “Highlights” 397). Although this was a steep request, with even Brazilian Foreign Minister Aranha suggesting that Caffery not request this from Vargas, Caffery asked Vargas anyway (Dur “Ambassador” 26). On March 7, 1942, in an infamous midnight telegram still known to this day, Caffery informed the United States “Vargas has given me the green light” (Dur “Highlights” 397; Dur “Ambassador” 26). Louisiana Representative F. Edward Hebert stated regarding Caffery’s negotiations, “It is most significant that the presence of our armed forces, both Army and Navy, has been established in Brazil without the signing of a single document or the enactment of a single treaty” (Dur “Highlights” 398). Considering that the United States now had access to the Corridor of Victory, Caffery was able to convince the War

Department to forget about requesting for the occupation of the Bulge (Dur “Highlights” 392). As Philip Dur points out, if Caffery had listened to Roosevelt’s orders of forcing Vargas’ consent of the occupation of the Bulge the year before, Vargas would have never allowed the United States access to the Corridor of Victory, and without the Corridor of Victory the United States would not have been able to defend Brazil and Africa during World War II, which would have completely changed the outcomes of World War II (Dur “Highlights” 392). Caffery’s plan was a complete success.

Nearly a year later on January 28, 1943, President Roosevelt set up a meeting with Vargas and Caffery at Natal, which was one of four South African provinces at the time, to discuss, as Philip Dur described it, “postwar peace-making” and to encourage the Brazilian President to take up “America’s global strategy,” i.e., joining the United Nations (Figure 1)(Britannica; Dur “Ambassador” 29). The United Nations, a name devised by Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1942, was officially established on October 24, 1945 (United Nations). In 1942, before the United Nations became an official organization, twenty-six nations joined together and pledged their allegiance towards working together to defeat the Axis powers during World War II (United Nations). After the war ended in 1945, additional countries joined and pledged their commitments to continue to work together in the future in order to prevent another world war from ever happening again in the future (United Nations). The United Nations is still in existence to this day.






*Figure 1: "The summit conference at Natal, January 28, 1943. Left to right, front to rear, Harry Hopkins, President Vargas, President Roosevelt, Ambassador Caffery, Rear Admiral Ross T. McIntire, President Roosevelt's physician, General Walsh, Admiral Ingram, and Admiral Beaugard" (Philip Dur, Highlights of His Career)*

Caffery and Vargas flew together from Brazil to Natal the day before their meeting with Roosevelt on January 27, 1943; the meeting was to take place the next day on January 28, 1943 (Dur "Highlights" 398). Aranha was Vargas' Foreign Minister and would therefore send Vargas "letters of advice" before any official meeting to suggest to Vargas what he should do in such instances (Dur "Highlights" 400). Previous to Vargas and Roosevelt's meeting at Natal, Aranha had let Caffery read his letter of advice to Vargas, which allowed Caffery to get a glimpse into Vargas' mind before the Natal conference actually occurred (Dur "Highlights" 400). According to Caffery, Brazilian Foreign Minister Oswaldo Aranha was the "American front" in Brazil and "for a long while he was the only prominent member of the government who was all-out on our side" (Dur "Highlights" 391). Caffery and Aranha were good friends and they worked well together; without Aranha, Caffery's ability for "getting things done" in Brazil would have been much less successful (Dur "Ambassador" 22; University of Louisiana at

Lafayette). As a result of Caffery reading Aranha's letter of advice, on the day of the Natal conference in the early morning, Caffery met alone with Roosevelt to debrief him on what he had read in Aranha's letter to Vargas; this is where Caffery suggested that Roosevelt carefully propose to Vargas that Brazil consider joining the United Nations (Dur "Highlights" 400; Dur "Ambassador" 29). Roosevelt told Caffery that the War Department did not want Brazilian forces in North Africa anymore, and therefore proposed another idea to Caffery that he would allow Brazil to begin to establish a Brazilian expeditionary force that the United States would send to some other territory for Brazil to defend during World War II; Caffery did not discourage Roosevelt from making this suggestion to Vargas later that day (Dur "Highlights" 400).

Vargas, Caffery, Roosevelt and Harry Hopkins, the chairman of the Munitions Allocation Board and Roosevelt's assistant, all met on board the destroyer at Natal on January 28, 1942 (Figure 2) (Dur "Ambassador" 29). Vargas and Roosevelt spoke entirely in French throughout the duration of their conversation, and considering Caffery was the only one who spoke French, he was the only one able to follow Vargas and Roosevelt's conversation unlike Harry Hopkins (Dur "Ambassador" 29). Ten days after the Natal conference, Vargas agreed to join the United Nations (Dur "Highlights" 400).

*Figure 2: Brazilian President Vargas (left) with President Roosevelt (middle) and Ambassador Jefferson Caffery (right) aboard the ship at Natal*



Brazil had always wanted to send ground forces to fight against the Axis powers and eventually the United States State Department approved (Dur “Ambassador” 29). When Vargas traveled back to Brazil, he was set on creating a Brazilian Expeditionary Force to prepare to send out for battle, which took two years to officially establish (Dur “Ambassador” 29; Dur “Highlights” 401). In April of 1943, the War Department made arrangements to send a Brazilian expeditionary force to Italy, and as a result, Brazil became the only other American republic to send ground forces into combat against the Axis powers during World War II (Dur “Ambassador” 30). When Brazil finally entered the line of combat in Italy in September 1944, Caffery was ordered to leave Brazil (Dur “Ambassador” 30). Unfortunately a month before Caffery left Brazil, Vargas found no use for Aranha anymore and he was forced out of office in August of 1944; on a positive note, at least Caffery had Aranha for the majority of his Brazilian post because if Aranha had been pushed out any earlier, Caffery may not have been as successful in his diplomacy (Dur “Highlights” 392).

Caffery’s legacy in Brazil extended far beyond his diplomatic abilities and completely changed the make-up of the Brazilian government for years to come. In April of 1943, Aranha had informed Caffery that Brazil was now “studying the ‘ways and means’” of

becoming a more democratic nation (Dur “Ambassador” 31). Caffery’s successor had lasted merely over a year in Brazil, when Caffery successfully lasted for seven (Dur “Ambassador” 31). In 1971, a famous Brazilian newspaper wrote a story covering the history of American diplomacy in Brazil, and while condemning all of the other American ambassadors as being too involved or disrespectful to Brazilian autonomy, Caffery, “hieratic and elegant, leaning on his cane, knew how to keep discreetly aloof, when it was necessary” (Dur “Ambassador” 31). Similarly, an associate of Caffery’s told The New York Times “that in a crisis, when the best interests of the United States could be served by doing nothing, Mr. Caffery ‘could be counted upon not to rush out and do something,’” which is exactly what Caffery so perfectly employed throughout his time in Brazil (The New York Times). Caffery never acted on impulse and always took into consideration how his actions could affect his relationships with the leaders of the countries he occupied, making sure to never end up on the wrong side of diplomacy. As Philip Dur wrote, “Diplomacy, Caffery knew, operates by confidence. Without mutual confidence, written commitments are of little value, and with it they are often unnecessary” (“Ambassador” 26). Trust and loyalty were what made Caffery different. Caffery never allowed greed to affect his decision-making and dedicated his entire life in service to the United States. Caffery was never motivated by personal self-interests, but rather motivated by his desire to further the interests of the United States through his diplomacy.

Caffery returned to Washington on September 19, 1944, with speculation that he was going to be sent to Paris soon for his new assignment (Dur “Ambassador” 31). When Vargas supposedly heard the news he replied,

*“The retirement of Ambassador Caffery from Brazil is very lamentable. He knows my country, my people, and our problems and has an exceptional position here. His*



*departure causes us great sorrow, but I realize that there is nothing I can do about it because President Roosevelt has important things for him to elsewhere.”*

–BRAZILIAN PRESIDENT VARGAS UPON HEARING OF AMBASSADOR CAFFERY’S RE-ASSIGNMENT TO PARIS, FRANCE (DUR “HIGHLIGHTS” 401-2)

According to the Brazilian officer who brought Vargas the news, “the little man, who had the reputation of having a heart of stone, spoke in a cracked voice and was on the verge of tears” (Dur “Ambassador” 31). Caffery left a lasting imprint on Brazil and the entire world through his service, ultimately leading the Allied powers to victory in World War II as a result.

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
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